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not purely driven toward modularity because of external forces. Individual CEO char-
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tion of managerial discretion. Systems such as organizations and their products are
acteristics may constitute an additional dimension to established mirroring considerations that impacts both the choice of architecture and the correspondence between
product and organization architectures.

I N T RO DU CT I O N

Mahoney, 2013). A key question is whether such architectural choices
are the result of the “iron cage” of institutional forces and isomorphic

How different pairings of firms’ product architecture and organization

pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or whether it is the individual

architecture arise and evolve over time, and whether there is a

characteristics of top manager's that drive these architectural choices.

mirroring across these different architectural levels is subject to a

While the degree of managerial discretion may vary between indus-

number of factors both external and internal to the firm (e.g., Colfer,

tries, we build our arguments using an upper echelons perspective

2007; Colfer & Baldwin, 2016; Sorkun & Furlan, 2017). While origi-

(e.g., Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Our analysis is rooted in the assump-

nally proposed in the form “products design organizations” (Sanchez &

tion that managerial choices are not purely the result of external

Mahoney, 1996), the direction of this so-called mirroring hypothesis

forces and that managers and their individual characteristics do

has been questioned. Complementing the original reasoning, Sanchez,

matter.

Galvin, and Bach (2013) suggest a “reverse mirroring hypothesis” to
also allow for “organizations designing products.”

The extant literature shows empirical support for such a “CEOeffect” on firm performance (Liu, Fisher, & Chen, 2018; Quigley,

Configuring complex systems such as product and organization

Crossland, & Campbell, 2017; Quigley & Hambrick, 2015). Individual

architectures and the respective supply chain is a design task

characteristics such as the CEO's age, tenure, experience, and per-

(Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Jacobides, 2005; Puranam, Alexy, & Reitzig,

sonality affect firms’ strategic choices and firm performance (for a

2014). The design challenge is to create a technical architecture and

meta-analysis, see Wang, Holmes Jr., Oh, & Zhu, 2016). Following

corresponding organization architecture that together are capable of

this rationale, we argue that top managers’ individual characteristics

carrying out complex tasks in efficient ways that allow the firm to

influence firms’ architectural choices. To build our theoretical posi-

compete in dynamic environments. Originating from the literature on

tion, we first summarize the literature on architectural choice and

strategic flexibility (Brozovic, 2018; Harrigan, 1985; Sanchez, 1995;

the mirroring hypothesis. We then present the core findings of the

Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996; Worren, Moore, & Cardona, 2002)

CEO effect as a conceptual foundation of our analysis. Combining

scholars put forward the notion that “strategizing managers” seek the

architectural choice (dependent variable) and CEO effect (indepen-

best combination of modular and integrated architecture pairings to

dent variable) we then derive propositions how individual CEO char-

allow the firm to capture value from both gains from specialization

acteristics affect firms’ architectural choices. The paper ends with a

and gains from trade (Sanchez, Galvin, & Bach, 2013; Sanchez &

discussion relating our propositions to the literature on mirroring
and misting and the embeddedness of firm architectures in industry

JEL classification code: L22.

architectures.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
© 2020 The Authors. Strategic Change: Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Strategic Change. 2020;29:25–33.

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jsc

25

26

BACH AND GALVIN

2 | MODULARITY, STRATEGIC
F L E X I B I LI T Y , A N D A R C H I T E C T U R A L
C HO I CE S

have shown that a shift toward modularity does not come without a
price. First of all, while a modular task structure enables transactions,
modularization is costly (Baldwin, 2008; MacDuffie, 2013). Standardizing components and interfaces evokes high ex-ante transaction

At its heart, modularity theory considers a system's ability to separate

costs that only pay off if subsequent transactions are high in number.

and recombine its elements without much loss of its functionality on

Second, the more specialized knowledge in modular architectures

the basis of assigning functionalities to modules, defining interfaces

blurs the perception on the “big picture”; modular architectures are

between the modules, and enacting standards that allow an assess-

known to lead to a “modularity trap” (Chesbrough & Kusunoki, 2001;

ment of the performance of a module (Baldwin & Clark, 2000;

Henderson & Clark, 1990). In modular architectures, learning takes

Campagnolo & Camuffo, 2010; Schilling, 2000). Applying the concept

place mainly at the component level (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996).

of modularity to organizations, Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) contend

Technological shifts at the architectural level are unlikely because

that the natural boundary of a firm is determined by its production

they are not in the interest of both neither component manufacturers

technology. This mirroring hypothesis (Baldwin, 2008; Colfer, 2007;

nor the owners of previously sold products (Chesbrough & Kusunoki,

Colfer & Baldwin, 2016) specifically links an organization's task struc-

2001; Galvin, 1999; Henderson & Clark, 1990).

ture to the actions of making and selling the outcomes of individual

When referring to “”architectures” or “architectural choices” we

tasks. Hence, as products and production technologies change, so do

subsequently take the (reverse) mirroring hypotheses for granted and

a firm's task structure and boundaries. While the most common view

refer to mirrored pairings of product and organization architectures.

is that “products design organizations” (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996),

Whenever we discuss a hybrid pairing or refer to only one of the

there is also empirical evidence for product design following organiza-

architectures we will explicitly use the terms “product architecture”

tion design (Fine & Whitney, 1996; Fixson & Park, 2008). Hence, the

and/or “organization architecture”.

direction of causality can be of either direction (Campagnolo &

Fundamentally, choosing a product and organization architecture

Camuffo, 2009; MacDuffie, 2013). Research to date has moved from

means choosing which markets to target and which value to capture

questioning whether mirroring occurs to conditions under which the

(MacDuffie, 2013). The different types of value associated with inte-

mirroring holds, and when hybrid architecture pairings—simultaneous

grated versus modular architectures have been elaborated in detail

mirroring and misting—arise (Burton & Galvin, 2018). However, this

(e.g., Sanchez, 2002, 2008). The general notion is that a given perfor-

research has focused very much on product characteristics

mance or cost optimization goal for a production system can be

(e.g., product complexity and rate of component change). We posit

achieved more effectively using an integrated architecture. Vice versa,

that the drivers of architectural choices are likely to go further and as

modular architectures allow quicker reaction to market changes and

such we introduce how managerial discretion and individual managers

through the plug-and-play capability, the same architecture allows

may affect firms’ architectural choices, and subsequent mirroring and

more product variety. Furthermore, modularization enables transac-

misting.

tions (Baldwin, 2008) with other, specialized actors, which in turn

Why do managers choose modular or integrated architectures?

allows to benefit from external economies of scale in intermediate

The key rationale to choose modular architectures is that they allow

markets (Jacobides, 2005), and to tap into collective knowledge and

firms to react quicker and more easily to competitive forces; product

learning processes (Langlois & Garzarelli, 2008). Summarizing all these

modularity is an enabler of firms’ strategic flexibility (Sanchez, 1995;

effects in an architectural decision making process, Sanchez, Galvin,

Schilling & Vasco, 2000; Worren et al., 2002). A modular product

and Bach (2013) argue that a firm's joint choice of product and organi-

design also allows the firm to organize its product development in a

zation architectures will be driven in important part by its assessments

modular structure, assigning certain development tasks to specialized

of value capture through gains from specialization and gains from

actors (Cabigiosu & Camuffo, 2012; Hoetker, 2006). In addition to

trade (Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides & Billinger, 2006; Sanchez, 2008,

using specialized knowledge for each component, a modular architec-

2012). A product—for example, a car—may be modular in some func-

ture has benefits at the architectural level: A modular architecture

tions (e.g., the wheels) and integrated in others (e.g., integrated body).

allows “each functional element of the product to be changed inde-

Because rims and tires are not custom built, car manufacturers can

pendently by changing only the corresponding component [whereas]

achieve both gains from specialization and gains from trade by choos-

… fully integral products require changes to every component to

ing a modular design for the wheels with market standard interfaces.

effect change in any single functional element” (Ulrich, 1995, p. 426).

On the other hand, given performance and/or cost targets in the pro-

As a result of these technical system characteristics firms can (a) more

duction system can be more easily achieved with an integrated design

easily redefine their product strategies, (b) redeploy their chains of

for example, for the car body. As a result of these assessments, firms

resources in support of these refined product strategies, and

choose such combinations of integrated and modular components for

(c) redefine their product offering by including new resources in their

which they expect the highest value generation.

product creation processes (Sanchez, 1995).

Managers also have to choose whether the product and organi-

While strategic flexibility seems favorable in dynamic environ-

zation architecture should mirror each other (mirroring) or differ in

ments, there is also a downside to choosing modular architectures.

total (misted mirror) or in part (partial mirroring and partial misting);

Studies on industries in which modular architectures are prevalent

this has been found for example in a study of the laptop computer
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industry (Hoetker, 2006). The factors that lead to “mist in the mirror”

The subsequent sections summarize the arguments on CEO age,

have been identified as high levels of product complexity

tenure, formal education, prior experience, and personality identified

(e.g., MacDuffie, 2013; Zirpoli & Becker, 2011) and a high rate of

as key variables in a meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016).

component change (Furlan, Cabigiosu, & Camuffo, 2014). Also, a
number of contextual product characteristics leads to “simultaneous
mirroring and misting,” “partial mirroring,” or “hybrid pairings”

3.1

|

CEO age

(Burton & Galvin, 2018).
Summarizing the above literature review on architecture choice

Hambrick and Mason (1984) argued that firms led by younger CEOs

firms seek to create value by choosing combinations of modular or

take more risk. Younger CEOs have accumulated less personal wealth

integrated designs depending on (a) given performance or cost targets

than older CEOs; they have less to loose. Hence, young CEOs will be

and (b) the availability of specialized knowledge and the cost to con-

more likely to initiate aggressive strategic actions to generate personal

nect with (intermediate) markets through which this knowledge can

and organizational wealth than older CEOs (Yim, 2013). On the other

be accessed.

hand, older CEOs possess more complex cognitive schemes, accumulated and refined during their lifetime. While this provides a larger
knowledge base to assess and interpret new information correctly, it

3 | U P P ER E C H E L O N S TH E O R Y A N D C E O
EFFECT

takes older CEOs more time to learn and to integrate new information. Furthermore, older CEOs may have a stronger interest in
protecting their accumulated wealth. As a result, older CEOs might be

At its core upper echelons theory (UET) argues that firms’ strategic

more committed to the status quo and less likely to take risk (Serfling,

choices are not purely determined by external factors and that man-

2014). Empirically, the meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016) finds that

agers do matter. In this article we posit that—as any other strategic

CEO age is significantly and negatively related to firm risk taking and

decision—architectural choices also depend on managers and their

product innovation.

individual characteristics. The rationale of UET states that executives
act on the basis of their personal interpretation of the strategic situation as a function of their experience, values, and personality

3.2

|

CEO tenure

(Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Based on the seminal
article by Hambrick and Mason (1984), three UET streams of research

CEO tenure is among the most studied CEO characteristics in UET

coevolved (Liu et al., 2018). The probably largest and most influential

research (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella Jr., 2009). Because short-

UET research stream examines which attributes of top management

tenured CEOs have less experience in the CEO position, they are

as a team (e.g., team composition) affect firm performance

more likely to experiment with different strategies (Hambrick &

(e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Kilduff, Angelmar, & Mehra,

Fukutomi, 1991). Later on, as their career advances, CEOs build leg-

2000). A second stream—which we focus on—comprises studies of

acy. The longer their tenure, the less CEOs are willing to put their leg-

how individual CEO attributes are related to firm strategy

acies at risk (Matta & Beamish, 2008). Also, early in their tenure CEOs

(e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Hayward & Hambrick,

are at higher risk of dismissal (Shen & Cannella Jr., 2002); this moti-

1997; Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010). The results of this research

vates them to take higher risks and prove their competence

stream are also known as the CEO effect (e.g., Quigley & Hambrick,

(e.g., Prendergast & Stole, 1996). Empirically, the meta-analysis by

2015). Finally, the third research stream considers how individual

Wang et al. (2016) finds that CEO tenure is significantly and nega-

CEO attributes impact top management team (TMT) processes

tively related to strategic risk and strategic change. Furthermore CEO

(e.g., Ling, Simsek, Lubatkin, & Veiga, 2008; Ou et al., 2014; Sim-

tenure has a significant and negative relationship with product

sek, 2007).

diversification.

To derive propositions for architectural choices we focus upon
the CEO effect literature stream. Originating from Hambrick and
Mason's (1984) original model, empirical research has investigated a

3.3

|

CEO formal education

variety of performance effects such as diversification, innovation, and
strategic change. Individual attributes as independent variables in the

CEO formal education is a proxy of CEO cognitive ability, empirically

empirical studies include the CEO's age (Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Yim,

studied as the amount of formal schooling received or the number of

2013), gender (Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2016; DeJoy, 1992; Eckel &

postsecondary degrees CEOs hold. The higher the cognitive ability,

Grossman, 2008), functional experience (Barker & Mueller, 2002;

the easier CEOs acquire and process complex information and the

Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998), education (Ng & Feldman, 2009), interna-

faster they make decisions (Wally & Baum, 1994). Formal education

tional experience (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Khavul,

also may indicate a CEO's openness to novel concepts (Thomas,

Benson, & Datta, 2010), and a number of personality attributes

Litschert, & Ramaswamy, 1991). Similarly, formal education results in

(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011; Chen, Crossland, & Luo, 2015; Hiller &

rich knowledge bases and skill sets that allow CEOs to understand

Hambrick, 2005; Simsek et al., 2010).

and process information more quickly and accurately (Kimberly &
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Evanisko, 1981; Ng & Feldman, 2009). Empirically, the meta-analysis

(2013: 389) explicitly address such “managerial and organizational fac-

by Wang et al. (2016) shows a positive and significant correlation

tors” as enablers and limitations to pursuing a modular strategy. In

between CEO formal education and strategic scope, strategic risk, and

their decision process, managers must first realize the speed and flexi-

strategic change.

bility advantages of modular designs, and second they also must be
willing and able to undertake the strategic organizational change
required to implement modular designs.

3.4

|

In a similar vein, MacDuffie (2013) explicitly differentiates “modu-

CEO experience

larity as frame” as a prerequisite to modularization processes and
Prior CEO career experiences shape CEOs cognitive schemes, how

modular designs. Based on his analysis of the global automotive indus-

they perceive and process information, and how they utilize it to make

try, he argues that modularity-as-frame drives the directionality of the

decisions (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Law-

interplay between modularity-as-property and modularization-as-pro-

rence & Lorsch, 1967). In particular, the CEO's functional background

cess. Fundamentally, the concept of modularity is argued to be “a

(e.g., throughput experience like production) to a high degree deter-

powerful cognitive frame” (MacDuffie, 2013, p. 37) for managers tak-

mines which business strategies are pursued and which projects are

ing design choices, reflecting the goals of the senior leader or domi-

given higher priority. Because of their functional perspective and

nant coalition.

functional targets, marketing and sales managers set other priorities

We take the notion of modularity-as-frame as our baseline argu-

than operations or procurement managers. Other aspects of CEO

ment: managers cognitive frames are a prerequisite for modular

experience studied in UET research include international experience

designs, and managers (modular) cognitive frames constitute a third

(e.g., Khavul et al., 2010), industry experience (Simsek, 2007), and

dimension in the mirroring hypothesis. This leads to our first and sec-

prior career experience in executive-level positions at other firms

ond proposition regarding the CEO effect on architectural design

before becoming the CEO (e.g., Zhang, 2008). In general, with experi-

choice:

ence CEOs become more comfortable to make decisions and to implement them (Liu et al., 2018). While the effect of CEO experience is

Proposition 1a Managers will choose modular designs (mirrored or mis-

theoretically sound, due to aggregate measures of experience, the

ted pairings of modular product and modular organization design)

meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016) finds no significant support for

only if they possess a cognitive frame of modularity that (a) is

general measures of experience. However, an analysis of more spe-

applicable to their firm, and (b) leads to positive evaluations.

cific experience categories shows a significant and positive relationship between CEO task experience and strategic scope and

Proposition 1b Managers will choose misted or hybrid pairings of prod-

strategic risk.

uct and organization design only if their cognitive frame of modularity (a) allows deviations from the mirroring and (b) these
deviations are expected to bear lower risks or to yield better

3.5

|

CEO personality

results.

UET research on CEO personality typically examines constructs

Applying these baseline hypotheses to the UET model of strategic

related to positive self-concept. Individuals with positive self-concept

choice leads to a model as shown in Figure 1. In addition to the origi-

hold favorable self-images and are more likely to view themselves as

nal UET model, we posit that individual CEO characteristics will have

exceptional, potent, admirable, and important (Finkelstein et al., 2009;

a moderating effect on the degree to which the level of product com-

Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997). As positive

plexity and the rate of component change CEOs affect the isomor-

self-concept increases, CEOs are more confident in themselves and

phism

their capabilities, are less focused on their own limitations, experience

architecture.

between

and

mirroring

of

product

and

organization

less anxiety, and are more comfortable making decisions to pursue

We now turn to individual CEO characteristics that are known to

“large-stakes initiatives” (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005, p. 311). Empirically,

affect CEO's strategic choices and for each of these characteristics we

the meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016) shows that CEO positive self-

derive propositions for both the direct effect on architectural choice

concept is positively associated with the category of strategic risk.

and the moderating effect on (partial) mirroring.

4

4.1

|

ANALYSIS AND PROPOSITIONS

|

CEO age

Modularity has been described as a cognitive frame (MacDuffie,

Older CEOs possess more complex cognitive schemes, as may be

2013). Only if managers understand the advantages of product modu-

necessary to grasp integrated architectures. Hence, younger CEOs

larity and develop the managerial skills to manage modular organiza-

may not be capable to understand the interconnection of integrated

tions they will be able to choose and implement modular strategies

architectures. Furthermore, modular architectures allow firms to

(Baldwin & Clark, 2000; Sanchez, 1995). Sanchez and Mahoney

respond to changes in demand more quickly. Taking advantage of
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• High level of
product complexity
• High rate of
component change

FIGURE 1

CEO Characteristics
Cognitive Frame

Objective Situation

Architectural Choices
• Product
Architecture
• Organization
Architecture

• Age
• Tenure
• Formal
Education
• Experience
• Personality

• Mirroring

Performance
•
•
•
•

Survival
Growth
Profitability
Innovation

Upper echelons theory, CEO effect, and architectural choices

the plug-and-play functionality of modular architectures requires

Proposition 3a CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to choose integrated architectures whereas CEOs with shorter tenure will prefer

quick but less refined learning processes; this is easier for younger

modular architectures.

CEOs. Older managers learn slower, but relate new knowledge to
their broad and refined cognitive schemes. Such learning processes
are better suited to enhance an established architecture. On the

With CEO age, we expect CEO tenure to moderate the effect of

contrary, making investments in new components or taking new

product complexity and rate of component change on the mirroring

suppliers on board in a modular architecture requires a learning

hypothesis. High levels of product complexity and a high rate of com-

style which is more often found among younger CEOs. Hence, we

ponent change can only be mastered with a flexible strategy. This is

posit:

more likely for shorter tenured CEOs. We posit:

Proposition 2a Older CEOs are more likely to choose integrated archi-

Proposition 3b The effect of product complexity and rate of component
change on the mirroring hypothesis (mist in the mirror) will be

tectures whereas younger CEOs will prefer modular architectures.

stronger for CEOs with shorter tenure than for CEOs with longer
tenure.

We also expect CEO age to affect the effects of both product
complexity and rate of component change on the mirroring hypothesis. High levels of product complexity and a high rate of component
change lead to “mist in the mirror.” Both require quick learning pro-

4.3

|

CEO formal education

cesses, which is easier for younger CEOs. We posit:
The higher the cognitive ability, the easier CEOs acquire and process
Proposition 2b The effect of product complexity and rate of component

information, and the faster they make decisions (Wally & Baum,

change on the mirroring hypothesis (misted mirror) will be stronger

1994). Empirically, the meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016) shows a

for younger CEOs than for older CEOs.

positive and significant correlation between CEO formal education
and strategic scope, strategic risk, and strategic change. Modular
architectures allow changes in scope and strategic change by changing

4.2

|

CEO tenure

individual components based on market demands. To monitor a number of (potential) markets and to process the respective information

Short-tenured CEOs are more likely to experiment with different

requires higher cognitive abilities than monitoring changes in demand

strategies before they build a legacy. Such managerial action is easier

within the scope of an integrated architecture. Hence we posit:

within modular architectures providing a plug-and-play functionality
of the components. Empirically CEO tenure is significantly and nega-

Proposition 4a CEOs with a higher degree of formal education are more

tively related to strategic change and product diversification. This

likely to choose modular architectures whereas CEOs with low for-

leads to the assumption that once a strategy proves successful, CEOs

mal education are more likely to choose integrated architectures.

hold on to that strategy with continuing tenure. Consistent strategy
over time does not require strategic flexibility anymore and, therefore,

CEO formal education and their cognitive abilities also moderate

longer tenured CEOs may focus performance targets within cost con-

the effect of product complexity and rate of component change on

straints. From an architectural perspective, such strategic goals are

the mirroring hypothesis. High levels of product complexity and a high

easier to achieve choosing integrated architectures. Hence, longer

rate of component change are easier to master with higher cognitive

tenured CEOs are more likely to favor integrated architectures.

abilities. We posit:
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Proposition 4b The effect of product complexity and rate of component

modular architecture involves dealing with market uncertainty and

change on the mirroring hypothesis will be stronger for CEOs with

behavioral risks of cheating suppliers, each supplier may be replaced

more formal education than for CEOs with less formal education.

by another supplier. On the contrary, from a risk-taking perspective,
choosing an integrated architecture means putting all eggs in one basket. We posit:

4.4

|

CEO experience
Proposition 6a CEOs with a less positive self-concept are more likely to

CEO prior career experiences shape CEOs cognitive schemes, how

choose modular architectures whereas CEOs with a high positive

they perceive and process information, which priorities they assign,

self-concept will prefer integrated architectures.

and how they make decisions (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). We argue that CEOs with a

As strategic risk correlates with positive self-concept, we argue

functional background in output functions (e.g., sales, marketing) give

that positive self-concept moderates the effect of product complexity

higher priority to market requirements and changes in customer pref-

and rate of component change on the mirroring hypothesis. High

erences. This is easier to achieve using modular architectures. On the

levels of product complexity and a high rate of component change

contrary, CEOs with a functional background in throughput functions

invoke higher strategic risks than low complexity and a low rate of

(e.g., operations, logistics) will give higher priority to given perfor-

change. We posit:

mance goals under cost restrictions. This is easier to achieve choosing
integrated architectures. We posit:

Proposition 6b The effect of product complexity and rate of component
change on the mirroring hypothesis (misted mirror) will be stronger

Proposition 5a CEOs with a functional background and task experience

for CEOs with a high positive self-concept than for CEOs with a
less positive self-concept.

in throughput functions are more likely to choose integrated architectures whereas CEOs with a functional background and task

A summary of the above analysis and the main rationale for each

experience in an output function will prefer modular architectures.

of the CEO characteristics is depicted in Figure 2.
CEOs functional background and task experience also moderate
the effect of product complexity and rate of component change on
the mirroring hypothesis. High levels of product complexity and a high

5

|

DI SCU SSION

rate of component change, because of their task experience, are more
easily recognized and then given higher priority by CEOs with task

In this article we argue that the CEO effect known from UET research

experience in an output-oriented function. Vice versa, CEOs with task

also applies to architectural choices and the mirroring hypothesis.

experience in a throughput-oriented function will not as easily process

Fundamentally, we argue that individual CEO characteristics and the

information on high product complexity and high rate of component

respective cognitive frames constitute a third dimension in the mirror.

change. We posit:

Managers only choose modular architectures if they possess a cognitive frame that allows for decomposing the system in modules with

Proposition 5b The effect of product complexity and rate of component

defined functions. The process of modularization will only be started

change on the mirroring hypothesis (misted mirror) will be stronger

if managers can grasp the advantages of modular architectures and if

for CEOs with task experience in output-oriented functions and

they believe in higher value capture for modular designs in the mar-

will be smaller for CEOs with task experience in throughput-

kets they serve.

oriented functions.

Our analysis of individual CEO characteristics shows that there
are causal relations between CEO characteristics and architectural
choice. Furthermore, individual CEO characteristics also have a mod-

4.5

|

CEO personality

erating effect on the effect of product complexity and rate of component change on the type of mirroring. The theoretically derived causal

As positive self-concept increases, CEOs are more confident in them-

effects of age dependent learning styles, tenure influencing strategic

selves and their capabilities, are less focused on their own limitations,

flexibility, cognitive abilities limiting or enabling strategic scope, task

experience less anxiety, and are more comfortable making decisions

experience affecting priorities, and CEO personality as a determinant

to pursue “large-stakes initiatives” (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005, p. 311).

of risk taking, all support the notion of a CEO effect on architectural

Empirically, the meta-analysis by Wang et al. (2016) shows that CEO

choice and mirroring.

positive self-concept is positively associated with the category of stra-

With our analysis we contribute to both UET and modularity the-

tegic risk. Based on these findings we argue that managing integrated

ory. Regarding UET, we expand the range of strategic choices ana-

architectures requires a more positive self-concept than managing a

lyzed by adding architectural choices as a dependent variable. With

modular architecture. Because of their plug and play functionality,

our propositions, we show that the general UET model also can be

modular designs allow to spread risk. While each market interface in a

applied to managers’ architectural choices. Furthermore, we show that
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FIGURE 2

Individual CEO
Characterisc
Age

Raonale

Tenure

Flexibility vs.
legacy

Formal
educaon

Cognive
ability

Task
experience

Focus of
priories

Personality

Posive selfconcept and
risk taking

Learning style

Choice:
Modular Architectures
Younger CEOs learn faster
which is needed to take
advantage of plug & play
funconality
Less tenured CEOs are more
inclined to strategic change
and diversiﬁcaon

Choice:
Integrated Architectures
Older CEOs possess more
reﬁned knowledge which is
needed to grasp integrated
designs
Longer tenured CEOs hold on
to their legacy

Moderang Eﬀect
on Mirroring Hypothesis
The eﬀect of misng
determinants will be stronger
for younger CEOs

More market interfaces (and
respecve changes in
demand) require higher
cognive abilies
CEOs with task experience in
market related funcons give
higher priority to strategic
ﬂexibility
Modular designs allow plug &
play changes in components
which implies risk spreading

Fewer market interfaces (and
respecve changes in
demand) require lower
cognive abilies
CEOs with task experience in
throughput funcons give
higher priority to given
performance and cost targets
Integrated designs imply risk
bundling

The eﬀect of misng
determinants will be stronger
for CEOs with higher formal
educaon
The eﬀect of misng
determinants will be stronger
for CEOs with task experience
in output-oriented funcons
The eﬀect of misng
determinants will be stronger
for CEOs with higher posive
self-concept

The eﬀect of misng
determinants will be stronger
for CEOs with shorter tenure

Propositions regarding CEO effect and architectural choices

individual CEO characteristics moderate direct effects from the environment on strategic choice. Regarding modularity theory, other than
in Schilling's (2000) seminal article, we highlight that it is not systems
“being driven” or “evolving” or “adapting to changes.” It is managers
that make architectural choices based on their perception of the
external environment and their information processing based on their
individual characteristics. We propose a CEO effect in systems being
modular or integrated.
Our analysis at the moment is pure theoretical reasoning. In a
next step, the propositions will need to be refined and be formulated
as hypotheses that can be put to an empirical test. Future research
should also include findings from the other two streams in UET
research, namely top management teams and the effect of individual
CEO characteristics on top management team processes.
Expanding the findings from this article on architectural choices
at the firm level to architectures at the industry level, future research
should address the question how individual CEO characteristics shape
the evolution of industry standard architectures (Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006; Sanchez, Galvin, & Bach, 2013). While institutional theory may explain this phenomenon through institutional
forces and mimetic processes at the firm level, this finding may have a
micro-foundation in CEOs with similar cognitive frames based on similar CEO characteristics. From a UET perspective it would not be surprising that CEOs of similar age and tenure, having served in the same
industry in similar functions, in a given industry environment take the
same architectural choices.
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